Better residential than ethnic discrimination! Reconciling audit's findings and interviews' findings in the Parisian housing market by Bonnet, François et al.
! 
 
Laboratoire interdisciplinaire d'évaluation des politiques publiques  
LIEPP Working Paper 
February 2015, nº36 
Better residential than ethnic 
discrimination! 
Reconciling audit’s findings and 
interviews’ findings in the Parisian 
housing market 
 
 
François Bonnet 
CNRS Pacte – Université de Grenoble Alpes 
françois.bonnet@iepg.fr 
 
Etienne Lalé 
Department of Economics, University of Bristol 
etienne.lale@bristol.ac.uk  
 
Mirna Safi 
Department of sociology, Sciences Po OSC, CNRS, LIEPP 
mirna.safi@sciencespo.fr 
 
Etienne Wasmer 
Sciences Po, Department of Economics and LIEPP 
etienne.wasmer@sciencespo.fr 
 
 
www.sciencespo.fr/liepp 
© 2015 by the authors. All rights reserved.  
Better residential than ethnic discrimination!
Reconciling audit’s findings and interviews’
findings in the Parisian housing market*
François Bonnet†, Etienne Lalé‡, Mirna Safi§, Etienne Wasmer¶
January 2015
Abstract
This article investigates discrimination and the interplay of residential and ethnic
stigma on the French housing market using two different methods, paired-testing au-
dit study of real estate agencies and face-to-face interviews with real estate agents.
The juxtaposition of their findings leads to a paradox: interviews reveal high levels
of ethnic discrimination but little to none residential discrimination, while the audit
study shows that living in deprived suburbs is associated with a lower probability of
obtaining an appointment for a housing vacancy but ethnic origin (signaled by the
candidate’s name) has no significant discriminatory effect. We have three priors po-
tentially consistent with this apparent paradox and re-evaluate their likelihood in light
of these findings: (i) agents make use of any statistical information about insolvency,
including residency; (ii) there are two distinct and independent taste discriminations,
one about space and one about ethnicity; (iii) these two dimensions exist and comple-
ment each other.
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Introduction
The concentration of ethnic minorities in underprivileged neighborhoods is a stylized fact in Western
societies (Johnston, Poulsen and Forrest, 2007; Musterd, 2005; Peach, Robinson and Smith, 1981). Em-
anating from discriminatory processes, ethnic segregation may also lead in turn to “residential traps” that
affect minority populations’ socioeconomic achievements, from access to education to economic success
and the building of social networks (Crane, 1991; Sampson, Morenoff and Gannon-Rowley, 2002).
While there is a wide range of literature on the cumulative aspect of residential and ethnic/racial
inequalities in the United States (Denton and Massey, 1993; Wilson, 1978, 1987), the interaction between
ethnic and residential stigma has seldom been analyzed in audit studies on housing discrimination. The
only exception we are aware of being a study of the credit market by Ross and Yinger (2002).1
In France, chronic urban riots in the banlieues over the last thirty years reinforce the idea of a French
racial question (Waddington, Jobard and King, 2013). Still, urban studies in France rarely consider
ethnicity in general and ethnic discrimination in the housing market in particular, despite some recent
works providing evidence of a residential discrimination along with an ethnic one and reviewed in the
next Section. By residential discrimination we refer to discriminatory decisions precisely oriented against
the individual’s residential area. Such practice has become explicitly illegal since Dec. 14, 2013 in
France: "residential discrimination" is the 20th criteria of discrimination against individuals.2
France is an interesting case to study discrimination because the country ostensibly promotes a color-
blind ideal of race relations (Sabbagh and Peer, 2008; Safi, 2008; Simon, 2008). For instance, the French
Republican model forcefully rejects ethnicity, culture, and religion as a basis for political organization,
claims-making, and even historically as the basis of categories for official statistics. Ethnicity per se is
consequently not reported in any French public statistics survey. This makes it difficult for race-based
affirmative action to be enforced and for inequality to be documented through representative data.
In this context, our article aims at analyzing the association between ethnic origin (specifically North-
African background) and residential origin (coming from a deprived neighborhood) in a potentially dis-
criminatory interaction in the housing market in France. Our goal is to explore how ethnic and residential
stigma can be disentangled in the measurement of discrimination by analyzing practices and discourses
about the overlap between these two criteria. To do so, we employ two methodological designs:
• An experimental paired-testing audit study, in the tradition of statistical analyses of discrimination,
which aims to measure the interaction of ethnic and residential effects.
• A qualitative study, based on interviews with real estate agents who were asked open-ended ques-
tions about the selection process of housing applicants.3
1The link between racial and spatial stigma has been explored more frequently in qualitative research; see for instance
Kirschenman and Neckerman (1991).
2It should be noted that residential location in deprived and segregated areas has also considerable legal socioeconomic
consequences, well documented in the urban literature, undermining people’s life chances in terms of education, health,
employment, etc.
3The agents we interviewed are not necessarily the same as the agents we audited, and we will explain why this is not of
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Each method has its own advantages and limitations. While the audit study actually measures the role of
the two criteria on discrimination, it does not address the mechanisms underlying ethnic and residential
stigma. Conversely, face-to-face interviews provide discursive evidence on discrimination and describe
its underlying micro social processes, but cannot assess discriminatory practices. Complementary use of
both methods helps overcome their own specific shortcomings and, as a matter of fact, the juxtaposition
of our audit and interview findings leads to a double paradox:
1. Although real estate agents believe ethnic discrimination to be widespread, it is not statistically
significant in an audit study that controls for residential origin but is when residential origin is not
controlled for.
2. Although real estate agents do not mention residential discrimination, it is statistically present in
this audit study.
This article analyzes this discrepancy, highlighted in many studies of discrimination, between discourses
and practices, and attempts to provide interpretations. We first review the research background and
present our two sets of findings, then attempt to decode the double paradox that results. We then review
alternative hypotheses that are consistent with these findings and may help us solve the paradox.
1 The association between residence-based and ethnic discrimina-
tion in housing: background and hypotheses
1.1 Space and ethnicity in discrimination studies
There is now an extensive sociological and economic literature showing, through survey results, that
residential location has significant effect on employment, education, crime, etc (Brueckner and Zenou,
2003; Fernandez and Su, 2004; Sampson and Sharkey, 2008). Despite this well documented role played
by segregation and residential location in the production and perpetuating of inequality, the concept
of “residential discrimination” has seldom been used and its effect rarely measured in audit studies on
discrimination. Conversely, ethnic and racial discrimination in American cities has been measured with
audit studies for more than three decades now (Committee on National Statistics, 2002, 2004; Fix and
Struyk, 1993). These studies regularly document unequal treatment disadvantaging ethnic and racial
minorities at various stage of the housing search process, both in the rental and ownership markets (Turner
et al., 2013). The 2012 U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD)’s study has in
particular shown that Hispanics face higher levels of discrimination in the rental market (followed by
Blacks and Asians); for example they learn about 12 percent fewer available housing units (compared to
white housing applicants) when they contact real-estate agents to inquire about recently advertised units.
consequence.
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Comparisons of HUD’s findings over time interestingly show that although “blatant” discrimination
has declined – minority applicants are less likely to get the door slammed in their faces –, the overall
level of discrimination remains high because of more subtle forms of discrimination. For instance minor-
ity applicants are more likely to be told that they must talk to a lender before being shown an advertised
home for sale (whereas the white tester is able to meet with the agents without being asked about prequal-
ification). This changing framing of discriminatory practices challenges the conventional measurement
of discrimination in pair-testing studies and requires more attention to several details in the nature and
quality of the interactions between the testers and the audited agencies or landlords.
Finally, in the majority of studies, measurements of ethnic and racial discrimination are interpreted
as related to conscious motivations. This is corroborated by some findings on ethnic and racial neigh-
borhood preferences highlighting whites’ unwillingness to live in neighborhood with high proportion of
ethnic minorities, particularly African Americans (Charles, 2009). In an audit similar to ours, Ahmed
and Hammarstedt (2008) find that in the rental market male applicants with a Swedish name are much
more likely to be called back than applicants with Arab names (with more mixed evidence for female
applicants).
1.2 Review of discrimination and immigration studies in the French context
Similar studies are rare in France and research on ethnic segregation and discrimination in housing has
only emerged recently. Most scholars have analyzed ethnic segregation as directly linked to “color blind”
market mechanisms of social stratification. Recent studies challenge this, showing that ethnic segrega-
tion is of higher magnitude than socioeconomic segregation and that it decreases very slowly (Préte-
ceille, 2009; Rathelot and Safi, 2014; Safi, 2009; Verdugo, 2011). French public statistics on housing
also document considerable inequality between natives and immigrants. Such inequality occurs not only
in housing access and tenure, but also in housing quality, such as amenities and apartment size (Barou,
2002; Breem, 2009). The immigrants’ housing situation is particularly disadvantaged for non-Europeans
and is resistant to standard socioeconomic controls, suggesting underlying ethnic discrimination. In a
recent comprehensive survey on immigration and discrimination, first and second generation immigrants
are shown to report twice more discrimination in housing access than natives with non-immigrant back-
ground (Safi and Simon, 2014). Here again, control for socioeconomic variables suggests that ethnic or
racial discrimination may be, at least partly, at play.4 However, at present, there is almost no audit study
based evidence of discrimination in the housing market in France.5
There is, however, well-established evidence of discrimination in the French labor market (Duguet
et al., 2010; Duguet, L’Horty and Petit, 2011). One of the most comprehensive audit studies, conducted
4According to the same survey, the majority of respondents proposed their skin colon and/or their ethnic origin as dis-
criminatory factors.
5The limited evidence of the extent of ethnic housing discrimination is from an audit study carried out by the Haute Au-
torité de Lutte contre les Discriminations et pour l’Egalité, according to which ethnic minority candidates (namely Africans)
are four times less likely to be selected to rent an apartment compared to their paired French white candidates (HALDE, 2006).
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jointly by the ministry of labor and the International Labour Organization, shows that, four times out of
five, employers prefer mainstream candidates to strictly identical candidates of African immigrant back-
ground (Cediey and Foroni, 2008). Research on ethnic discrimination in the labor market also provides
evidence of “residential” discrimination. For instance, job applicants have lower interview rates when
their curriculum vita provides an address indicating a poor suburb. The Cediey’s and Foroni’s audit
findings also indicate that living in a poor suburb per se undermines employability. Their explanatory
hypotheses draw on unobserved characteristics that employers may infer from the candidate’s residential
location (dependability, work ethic), or other observable contextual characteristics that may affect pro-
ductivity (transportation connectivity to inner cities, crime, etc). Wasmer and Zenou (2002) provide a
model of urban equilibrium unemployment where access to employment is negatively linked to distance
between residential location and jobs due to information loss, employer’s discrimination or connectivity
of public transportation networks. Gobillon, Rupert and Wasmer (2014) find that spatial factors such as
higher commute distance and poorer access to housing of minority workers can explain 20% of the ethnic
unemployment gap in France and about 15% in the US. Statistical studies have also documented a signif-
icant effect of residential location on finding a job (Duguet, L’Horty and Sari, 2009; Gobillon, Magnac
and Selod, 2011) and related these findings to the spatial mismatch literature. This research body raises
the question of the existence of discrimination against residential origin in France and of the extent to
which it may interact with ethnic discrimination.
France’s emerging racial question is linked to the postcolonial nature of a considerable share of its
immigration. While Europeans form the majority of first and second generation immigrants in France,
the most recent waves increasingly come from ex-French colonies (Algeria, Morocco, Tunisia and sub-
Saharan Africans mainly for francophone west Africa) (INSEE, 2012). There is growing empirical ev-
idence that North-Africans (also referred to as Arabs or Maghrebi) and Sub-Saharan Africans are the
most disadvantaged groups in regard to socio-economic and labour market attainment, residential segre-
gation, law and justice, health, etc. (Meurs, Pailhé and Simon, 2006; Safi, 2013; Silberman, Alba and
Fournier, 2007). The overwhelming majority of paired-testing audits conducted in France during the
last decade hence use North or Sub-Saharan Africans as the potentially discriminated group. More re-
cently, some studies focus on religious discrimination against Muslim origin (Adida, Laitin and Valfort,
2014). Although the first anti-discrimination law is rather old in France (it dates back to 1972), state-
level anti-discrimination action is traditionally weak and fragmented. In 2004, the French government
created a centralized anti-discrimination agency (Haute Autorité de Lutte contre les Discriminations et
pour l’Egalité) in a context of growing consciousness related to discrimination in the political and scien-
tific debates. The HALDE was however dismantled in 2011 and specific action towards racial and ethnic
discrimination has been increasingly reframed into a more general diversity promoting discourse (Bereni
and Jaunait, 2009; Doytcheva, 2010).
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1.3 In the search of “residential discrimination” in the housing market: disen-
tangling residential and ethnic effects
The majority of testing studies draws on Becker (1971)’s and Phelps (1972)’s frameworks of taste and
statistical discrimination, and are designed to empirically disentangle the underlying processes. In the
housing market in particular, statistical discrimination is tested for by adding information in the appli-
cant’s profile (see for instance Bosch, Carnero and Farre, 2010; Ewens, Tomlin and Wang, 2014). These
studies nevertheless only frame one criterion as being potentially discriminatory (namely ethnic/racial or
immigrant background) while other added information is not regarded as possibly brining about unequal
treatment. Our study thus adds to this literature by reflecting on the association between two poten-
tially discriminatory criteria that may affect housing outcomes. More precisely, we seek to test for three
hypotheses:
• Hypothesis one (H1): Real estate agents are primarily concerned with insolvency and they use
any potentially relevant information about the applicants as proxies to make inferences about their
unobserved solvency. In other words, ethnic and residential origins may lead to statistical discrim-
ination in a context of high legal constraints in the French housing market that increase landlords’
incentives to economically select tenants.
• Hypothesis two (H2): ethnic discrimination and residential discrimination both exist and are com-
bined through an additive effect on overall discrimination, with no particular interaction. If this is
the case, real estate agents would engage in pure discrimination against a given type of neighbor-
hood. This would be an instance of taste discrimination against a neighborhood. H2 thus consists
of a cumulated pure-taste discrimination hypothesis.
• Hypothesis three (H3): the neighborhood does not matter per se: agents merely use the informa-
tion about the neighborhood to infer applicant’s race or ethnicity. What appears as discrimination
against a neighborhood is in fact discrimination against racial or ethnic minorities. Legal scholars
call this indirect discrimination (Hunter, 1992): the use of legally unprotected characteristics to
achieve legally forbidden discrimination.
Our research design aims to examine these three different hypotheses, not necessarily exclusive from
each other, disentangling ethnic and residential stigma in the measurement of discrimination.
2 Research design: the complementary use of qualitative and quan-
titative frameworks
Direct accounts of discrimination in the social sciences usually fall into two categories (Blank, Dabady
and Citro, 2004; Pager and Shepherd, 2008):
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• Analyses of discriminatory attitudes, behaviors and discourses: studies that focus on the mental and
social constructions of prejudice and the micro social processes that may lead to discriminatory acts
(Fiske, 2000; Schuman et al., 1997).
• Measurements of discriminatory practices: studies that seek to uncover actual discrimination as
“a caught in the act” through experimental situations in order to measure its magnitude, evolution
and consequences (Fix and Struyk, 1993; Pager, 2007) following standard procedures of the HUD
described in Appendix A.1.
Only a few studies mobilize both qualitative and quantitative methodologies. These have led to contra-
dictory results, showing that what people say or think with regard discrimination is not coherent with
what they really do. This was the main finding of LaPiere (1934) classic study of discrimination in hotels
(people discriminate less than they express prejudice). More recently, Pager and Quillian (2005) have
conducted a similar study that shows an opposite discrepancy between attitudes and actions (people dis-
criminate more than they exhibit prejudice). In both cases, the authors’ interpretations are inclined to
trust the experimental measurement of discrimination acts whereas people’s attitudes are often regarded
as doubtful.6 The two methodologies of inquiring into discrimination are thus presented as concurrent
rather than complementary.
In this article, we first use an audit testing strategy to explore the association between residential and
ethnic effects, then we conduct a qualitative survey to assess the prevalence of ethnic or/and residential
stigma and how these stigma may affect real estate agents’ decision with regard tenants’ selection. It
should be noted that, unlike other studies that combine testing methods with qualitative interviews while
measuring discrimination, our qualitative and quantitative samples are not matched (LaPiere, 1934; Pager
and Quillian, 2005). We thus do not audit people we interview. We believe that this is not of consequence
to our argument because we constructed our sample of respondents for the qualitative study and of agen-
cies for our audit study on the same principles: just as we selected richer and poorer neighborhoods in
Paris and its region where we audited agencies, we contacted interview respondents in richer and poorer
neighborhoods in Paris and its region advertising the same type of goods advertised by the audited agen-
cies.
3 Measuring the intersection between ethnic and residential dis-
crimination factors: an audit study on the Parisian rental market
3.1 The audit study7
Our audit study was carried out in March and April 2009. A team of 8, aged 22 to 28, 2 women and
6 men (hereafter the “testers”) made a total of 500 phone calls to real estate agencies for 250 different
6Economists call this a logic of revealed preferences, after Samuelson (1938).
7A comprehensive description of our audit study is in Appendix A.
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housing vacancies in the Paris region. We collected advertisements for housing units from the website
http://www.seloger.com, the first internet platform at the time of the study.
The test was designed to detect the effect of two potentially discriminatory criteria: current place
of residence (deprived neighborhood) of the fictitious applicant, and ethnic origin (North-African back-
ground), as revealed by the name. Testers were matched by pairs: each tester thus had a co-tester he/she
worked with most of the time. They were instructed not to fake any particular acccent during the phone
conversations.8 Testers were assigned fictitious identities, which included a name, a place of residence,
an occupation and an income level. These were designed to reflect a typical middle-class housing appli-
cant, for instance: “Sébastien Fournier (French name) / Kader Boualem (North African name), lives in
La Courneuve (deprived suburb) / Versailles (rich suburb), is 31 years-old, works as an accountant and
earns a monthly wage of 1,700 euros”. These fictitious identities also included a marital status (married
with no children), an occupation and an income for the spouse.
As it was neither possible to test all the combinations between geographic and ethnic origins on
the same advertised dwelling nor to reveal all the relevant information within a phone conversation, we
limited the number of scenarios and designed two different procedures:
• In the first procedure (173 audits), each tester revealed his/her fictitious place of residence at the
beginning of the conversation and, as the conversation proceeded, he/she eventually gave his/her
name.
• The second procedure (77 audits) was similar but reversed: the fictitious name was revealed first,
with the tester attempting to provide information on his/her current location, without forcing mat-
ters.
The phone conversations that resulted from these procedures were usually as follows: in the very first
sentence, the tester expressed his/her interest for the advertised dwelling. Here are examples of the
introductory sentences testers would use:
• In procedure #1: “Hello, I’m calling about your ad for the apartment located in city X. I’m really
interested in renting this apartment since I need to move from city of the applicant where I
currently live to get closer to my job. Is it still available?”
• In procedure #2: “Hello, name of the applicant speaking. I’m calling about your ad no. X
found on the internet. I’m really interested in the apartment in the ad because I need to move to get
closer to my job. Is this still available?”
The typical conversation would then go on as follows:
8This rule reflected a trade-off: introducing accent would have increased unobserved heterogeneity (arbitrariness and thus
randomness) in the perception interpretations. Preventing accents likely biased downwards the intensity of discrimination.
See Section A.4 of Appendix A for further discussions.
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• If the apartment was still available, the applicant would then ask for an appointment to view the
apartment. The rental broker would eventually ask for more information about the applicant, and
the tester attempted to provide his/her name (procedure #1) or his/her place of residence (procedure
#2).
• If the apartment was no longer available, the rental broker would generally ask some additional
details to determine whether another apartment might meet the applicant’s demand, or would ter-
minate the conversation quickly.
The resulting phone conversations were thus short, focusing on the candidate’s profile and homogenous
across testers and procedures. In all cases, the testers could collect information about the rent, the surface
area and the location of the apartment from the advertisement on the Internet.
Following the phone call, testers reported the outcomes of the conversation, which were coded as
follows:
Code Outcome
1 Apartment is already rented, nothing else available
2 Caller is asked to send a written application with personal details
3 Real estate agent will call back, but no return call
4 Apartment is already rented but something else is available
5 Real estate agent plans a group visit
6 Real estate agent plans an individual visit
These coding schemes were the outcome of several days of trials on about 50 calls (which are not
included in our sample of audits). Overall, they proved sufficiently comprehensive for testers to report
the outcomes of the different phone conversations without being concerned that a relevant category was
missing.
3.2 Outcomes of the phone conversations
Figure 1 compares the distribution of outcomes of the phone conversations obtained under the two pro-
cedures, initially ignoring the paired-testing dimension of the experiment, pooling all applicants. Those
reveal similarities, suggesting that differences in the introductory sentence used by testers did not sig-
nificantly alter the interaction with the rental agent. In other words, in both procedures, the fictitious
applicants were able to arrange an individual viewing with the rental broker most of the time (35 to 40%
of all phone calls), and they were also likely to be told that the rental agent would call them back (32 and
35% of all phone calls).
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Figure 1. Outcomes of the phone conversations
NOTE: The figure represents in percentage the different possible outcomes of the phone conversations, under the first and the
second procedure (residence revealed first and ethnicity revealed first, respectively). All applications are pooled together.
3.3 Detecting discrimination: differences in outcomes across paired phone con-
versations
To simplify the presentation of the results, we group occurrences 1, 2 and 3 as “negative answers” and 4,
5 and 6 as “positive answers”.9 We use the term “minority candidate” to refer to the applicant from the
deprived suburb in the first procedure and to the applicant with a North African name in the second pro-
cedure. Note that the minority candidate in, for instance, the second procedure may have been assigned
a fictitious residence in a privileged suburb: the term “minority” refers only to the information revealed
first during the conversation. Accordingly, the paired-tester is labeled the “majority candidate”.
In Table 1, we crosstabulate the outcomes of the two candidates obtained under each procedure (resi-
dence first, or ethnicity first). The full results are displayed in Tables B1 and B2 of Appendix B. In each
panel, the first number is the number of cases and the second number is the frequency in the table, i.e.
the number of cases divided by the total number of cases studied. The on-diagonal coefficients report
the number of cases where the minority and the majority candidates were equally treated, at least when
9As rightly noticed by a referee, Code 4 (advertised unit was unavailable but “something else” was offered) could alter-
natively be interpreted either as "some discrimination" or "steering", and therefore be aggregated with codes 1, 2 and 3 ("rather
negative outcome"). Since there were few occurrence of this outcome (Figure 1), we adopt as a benchmark the aggregation of
Code 4 with Codes 5 and 6 (rather favorable). In Appendix B, we repeat our estimations after aggregating Code 4 with Codes
1 to 3. We also re-run our estimations after excluding applications involving occurrence of Code 4. None of these checks alter
the findings presented in this Section.
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Table 1. Cross-tabulation of the outcomes across paired phone calls
a. Procedure #1 (residence first) Outcome of the minority candidate
Rather negative (1,2,3) Rather positive (4,5,6) Total
Outcome of the majority candidate
Rather negative (1,2,3) 46 (26.6%) 24 (13.9%) 70 (40.5%)
Rather positive (4,5,6) 43 (24.9%) 60 (34.7%) 103 (59.5%)
Total 89 (51.5%) 84 (48.6%) 173
b. Procedure #2 (ethnicity first) Outcome of the minority candidate
Rather negative (1,2,3) Rather positive (4,5,6) Total
Outcome of the majority candidate
Rather negative (1,2,3) 30 (39.0%) 11 (14.3%) 41 (53.3%)
Rather positive (4,5,6) 7 (9.1%) 29 (37.7%) 36 (46.8%)
Total 37 (48.1%) 40 (52.0%) 77
grouping the different outcomes. For instance in the first procedure (panel a.) this occurred in 26.6%
+ 34.7% = 61.3% of all cases. The off-diagonal coefficients report unequal treatment, in the remaining
38.7% of cases. The upper-right cell reports cases where the minority candidates were better treated than
the majority candidate, which occurred in just 13.9% of cases. In contrast, the lower left cell reports cases
where the majority candidate was treated better than the minority candidate. This occurred in 24.9% of
cases.
In the second experience, where ethnicity was revealed first (panel b.), discrimination appears to be
much less important. In fact, the on-diagonal cases now constitute 76.7% of cases, the fraction of cases
in which the minority and the majority candidates are equally treated.
The off-diagonal coefficients reporting an unequal treatment reveal that the minority candidates was
better treated than the majority candidate in 14.3% of cases, while the majority candidate was actually
better treated in 9.1% of cases, that is, in fewer cases.
We can summarize the information in Table 1 by computing the discrimination rates displayed in
Table 2.
Table 2. Discrimination rates under the two procedures
Procedure #1 (residence first) Procedure #2 (ethnicity first)
NM/N 24.86% [18.42%, 31.30%] 9.10% [2.67%, 15.51%]
Nm/N 13.87% [8.72%, 19.02%] 14.29% [6.47%, 22. 10%]
z-statistic 2.585 -1.003
p-value 0.0097 0.3157
NOTE: NM (resp. Nm) denotes the number of audits in which majority (resp. minority) candidate obtains a positive outcome
while the minority candidate (resp. majority) does not. Numbers in brackets are 95% confidence intervals. The p-value is
associated to the null hypothesis that the relative difference NM Nm/N is significantly different from 0.
These discrimination rates confirm that the candidate from the deprived suburb was significantly less
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likely to have a positive response in the first procedure relative to his/her paired applicant, while there
was no significant evidence of a similar treatment against the candidate with a North African name in the
second procedure (or even the opposite here). The next subsection examines the robustness of these first
results and, as it happens, consolidates them.
3.4 Robust assessment of the presence of discrimination
We test different specifications that take advantage of the panel structure of our dataset to analyze whether
the phone conversations indicate discrimination against minority candidates. These specifications are
variants of a linear probability model that accounts for the probability of obtaining a positive outcome.
The generic model that we consider is:
yi,a = za+ gdi,a+bXi,a+ ei,a (1)
where yi,a is an indicator taking the value of one if applicant i obtains a favorable outcome in audit a,
za is a set of variables that characterize the paired audit, di,a is a dummy with the value of one if the
applicant is the minority candidate, and Xi,a is a set of controls that characterizes tester i in audit a. In the
baseline model, za includes some characteristics of the advertised dwelling, such as the surface, the rent,
etc. Next, we drop these in favor of audit fixed effects. Tables 3a and 3b reports the results from these
different regressions.
The regressions in Tables 3a and 3b confirm the rough calculations from Table 2: the applicant from
the deprived suburb in the first procedure (residence first) experiences a more than 10 percentage point
drop in the probability of obtaining a favorable outcome. The coefficient is precisely estimated and robust
to the set of controls included in the regression. Interestingly, there is no evidence of a less favorable
treatment for the minority candidate in the second procedure: having an Arab name has no significant
impact on the probability of obtaining a viewing.
In the first procedure (residence first), further revealing the name led to a significantly higher outcome,
regardless of the ethnicity of the name. This may be a simple statistical association and not a causal one:
this occurred only when the candidate was able to arrange a meeting for the viewing, i.e. when a positive
outcome had been obtained. The North African origin of the name is negative but not significant or very
marginally in columns (VI) and (VII). In terms of the other potentially discriminatory criterion (North
African name in the first procedure, deprived suburb in the second procedure), we find no significant
impact when this was revealed to the rental agent. This could be because we have fewer observations
in the second procedure, affecting the significance of the coefficients. To verify that this is not the case,
we replicated the regression with a bootstrap procedure (500 times) randomly selecting 77 pairs of calls
from the first procedure among the 177 initial pairs. The full results, reported in Table B3 of Appendix B,
reveal that the conclusions above still hold: the negative effect of living in a deprived suburb remains true
in all columns. The significance level is reduced: it is now at the 10% level in 4 out of 7 specifications,
12
Table 3a. Estimation results: Procedure #1 (residence first)
(I) (II) (III) (IV) (V) (VI) (VII)
Deprived suburb -0.1440 -0.1387 -0.1387 -0.1098 -0.1227 -0.1301 -0.1373
(0.0638) (0.0564) (0.0564) (0.0468) (0.0480) (0.0522) (0.0520)
Minority name 0.0567 0.0152 0.0152 0.1273 0.1046
(North Africa) (0.1110) (0.1004) (0.1004) (0.0924) (0.0939)
Name revealed 0.2431 0.1788 0.1788 0.2415 0.2373
(0.0987) (0.0833) (0.0833) (0.0997) (0.1009)
Name revealed -0.0932 0.0110 0.0110 -0.1888 -0.1747
x Minority Name (0.1276) (0.1123) (0.1123) (0.1175) (0.1161)
Controls:
Individual call Y Y Y Y Y
Vacancy characteristics Y Y Y
City level dummies Y Y
Fixed effects
Audit level Y Y Y Y
Pairs of testers Y Y
Individual testers Y Y
N 327 327 327 346 346 345 345
R2 0.7371 0.5972 0.5972 0.0311 0.0443 0.0668 0.0775
R2 with fixed effect 0.8264 0.8288 0.8352 0.8370
NOTE: Estimates that are statistically significant at the 5% level are in boldface. Standard errors in parentheses. Standard
errors are clustered at the audit level. Each column reports the coefficients g and b estimated along with a specific set of
controls for each procedure. Name revealed is a dummy indicating whether the tester revealed his/her name in the phone
conversation. Characteristics at the level of the individual phone calls are: a dummy indicating whether the tester used the
phone line with a number starting with 09 (indicating Internet box) and a dummy indicating whether he/she called first.
Vacancy characteristics include the rent and the surface of the advertised dwelling. City level dummies are dummies at the
level of the city when the dwelling is located outside of Paris or, otherwise, at the level of arrondissements.
and marginally less significant in the other three specifications.10
4 “Whom you discriminate against?” Asking real estate agents
The qualitative part of this paper was designed to confirm, or at least verify, whether the surprising
result of the audit testing strategy would be perceived by agents themselves, and whether they would be
conscious of the apparent importance of residence in the outcome. It however tells a different story, and,
incidentally, shows the importance of confronting different methodologies.
10This result is not surprising in the first procedure given that procedure #2 shows that having a North African name does
not play against the minority candidate. Conversely, why living in a deprived area has no significant impact in the second
procedure may seem puzzling given the robust effect obtained during procedure 1. This may be due to the small number of
phone calls in the second procedure during which the applicant from the deprived suburb managed to reveal this information
to the rental agent: 16 cases out of the 154 phone calls.
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Table 3b. Estimation results: Procedure #2 (ethnicity first)
(I) (II) (III) (IV) (V) (VI) (VII)
Minority name 0.0299 -0.1076 -0.1118 0.0519 0.0484 0.0502 0.0419
(0.0785) (0.1776) (0.1984) (0.0553) (0.0604) (0.0624) (0.0728)
Deprived suburb 0.0468 0.0481 0.0768 0.0261 0.0298
(0.0821) (0.0768) (0.0765) (0.0706) (0.0715)
Residence revealed 0.1001 0.3255 0.2365 0.0686 0.1148
(0.2553) (0.2494) (0.2499) (0.2213) (0.2578)
Residence revealed -0.2307 -0.3588 -0.4082 -0.1434 -0.1837
x Deprived suburb (0.2713) (0.2887) (0.3109) (0.2361) (0.2742)
Controls:
Individual call Y Y Y Y Y
Vacancy characteristics Y Y Y
City level dummies Y Y
Fixed effects
Audit level Y Y Y Y
Pairs of testers Y Y
Individual testers Y Y
N 144 144 144 154 154 154 154
R2 0.6295 0.5789 0.6358 0.0115 0.0194 0.0191 0.0305
R2 with fixed effect 0.8771 0.8787 0.8780 0.8801
NOTE: Standard errors in parentheses. Standard errors are clustered at the audit level. Each column reports the coefficients g
and b estimated along with a specific set of controls for each procedure. Residence revealed is a dummy indicating whether
the tester revealed his/her residential origin in the phone conversation. Characteristics at the level of the individual phone
calls are: a dummy indicating whether the tester used the phone line with a number starting with 09 (indicating Internet box)
and a dummy indicating whether he/she called first. Vacancy characteristics include the rent and the surface of the advertised
dwelling. City level dummies are dummies at the level of the city when the dwelling is located outside of Paris or, otherwise,
at the level of arrondissements.
4.1 Interviewing real estate agents
This involved 29 face-to-face semi-directive interviews with real estate agents in Paris and the surround-
ing Parisian region, conducted between June and October 2010. Each interview lasted at least one hour.11
These interviews firstly reveal that, while the overwhelming majority of agents tend to deny any form
of discrimination in their own decisions, they have a lot to say about the functioning of the market in
general and about other agencies’ discriminatory actions in particular.
4.2 Ethnic and racial discrimination is everywhere. . . but not here!
Perhaps unexpectedly, interviewees felt comfortable talking about discrimination, without us expressly
mentioning of the term. As soon as the section about the “ideal candidate” begins, the word “discrimina-
tion” arose naturally in the discussion, and was systematically associated with ethnic or racial dimensions.
11For more information about the interviews, please refer to Appendix C.
14
The issue of ethnic or racial discrimination was spontaneously raised by 13 interviewees (out of 29) with-
out any overt questioning by the interviewer. In all these cases, discrimination was directly associated to
ethnic and racial criteria, with skin color (or African origin) most cited.
Table 4 shows the recurrence of words referring to ethnic/racial criteria, distinguishing whether they
were used by the interviewees or the interviewers. Interviewer and respondent used the word “origin”
with equal frequency, whereas words indicative of ethnicity were predominantly used by interviewees.
On average, the words reported in Table 4 are used more than twice as frequently by the interviewee.
Table 4. Recurrence of words referring to ethnic/racial criteria in the interviews
Respondent Interviewer Ratio
Turk(s) 23 2 11.5
Africa, African, etc. 36 4 9.0
Black(s) 105 20 5.3
Arab(s) 26 6 4.3
White(s) 37 11 3.4
Race, racial 14 7 2.0
Racist, racism 45 23 2.0
Foreigner(s) 45 29 1.6
Origin 52 56 0.9
Ethnic, ethnicity 19 26 0.7
Total 402 184 2.2
Total per interview 13.9 6.3 2.2
Even though real estate agents spoke extensively about ethnic and racial discrimination, they sys-
tematically denounced it as “bad” and “illegal” and denied the existence of such practices in their own
agency.
Well I have people, blacks, who came to the agency and they told me, err. . . So I welcomed
them and they told me: “we just got sent on our way by – well, I won’t tell their name, an
agency not far from here [he laughs] and err. . . they’ve been told: “No, no Sir, we have
nothing to rent”. They had just arrived, and they were told: “we have nothing to rent”.
They most frequently blamed the landlords for pushing real estate agents into discriminating against
minorities, but said that whenever they had to deal with such landlords, they refused to comply. Besides
the fact that all testimonies converge on the salience of discrimination against black and Arab minorities,
some real estate agents provide the interviewer with objective figures quantifying such practices, saying
that almost 10% of renting offers come with discriminatory recommendations from landlords (“I don’t
want Arabs, blacks, etc.”).
- Do you have a recent experience of verbal complaint?
- Yeah, it happened maybe one year ago: someone went to complain to the person in charge
of rentals.
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- What do you say in those situations?
- Well, we tell them: we have presented the application to the landlord, and the landlord
decides. We can’t do anything about it. Because if we really did refuse that kind of persons,
according to me we are all persons, no matter the color, we are all human beings, therefore
this a behavior that makes me mad. If the person is working, I don’t see where there is a
problem. We can see the kind of people we’re dealing with. Now we can’t force landlords.
But us, we won’t refuse viewings to these people.
- And if you had to assess the percentage of racist demands?
- Yes, you can say that. It’s not the majority, but not matter how small. . . I don’t know, 10%?
Real estate agents often imply that they understand the landlords’ aversion to certain profiles who have
proved by experience to be unreliable (e.g. unpaid rent, sublease, damage). This argument builds even
more explicitly on statistical discrimination.
The landlord asks us to avoid certain categories of population. We don’t have the right. We
can’t do racism like that. Otherwise, we would only get into big trouble. But, it is true that. . .
Experience is such that we avoid certain categories of people because we realize that in these
categories we always have problems.
Let’s say that experience is that. . . we will be more careful with certain categories than with
others.
In short, when asked about the selection of applicants for housing rentals, real estate agents find racial
discrimination the obvious issue. However, they overtly condemn racial discrimination, describe it as a
landlords’ problem, not one of the real estate business itself. Some agents display understanding attitudes
toward forms of discrimination they find rational, other agents find the practice of discriminating on racial
grounds economically irrational. But they all see racial discrimination as the issue at stake.
4.3 Looking for residence-based discrimination
In stark contrast, none of the respondents spontaneously mentioned residential stigma. The interview
was planned so that the interviewer asked this question at the end of the conversation, after a lot of devel-
opments on discriminatory practices and their motivations. The question was formulated thus: “There is
much debate about ethnic and racial discrimination but do you think that other criteria might be at play,
for example residential ones?”, “If a candidates comes from underprivileged neighborhood, the suburbs,
etc. do you think this may disadvantage him/her in the renting market?”
This question was disconcerting to most real estate agents. An overwhelming majority could simply
not see why residence might have any impact. Almost all respondents said that they do not care where
a candidate lived. Some of them even assert that they rarely check the address when they examine the
candidate, or that they would not know in what kind of neighborhood a given address is located. Only
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two respondents elaborated on this question, mentioning association with linguistic stigma: according to
them, the problem is not the area of residence itself, but the fact that people from these neighborhoods
do “not express themselves well” or have particular “accent”. Only one single respondent admitted that
some locations (and he/she cited the most stigmatized French suburbs) can disadvantage candidates even
though he gave an example of labor market discrimination, not housing.
5 The paradox: a discussion
The confrontation of our audit and interview findings leads to a double paradox:
1. Real estate agents clearly deny the relevance of residence as a discriminatory factor in the housing
market while quantitative evidence tends to show that it has a significant disadvantaging effect in
access to housing.
2. Ethnic origin does not have a significant impact when the area of residence is controlled for in
the exploitation of the audit study data, while real estate agents report that it has an indisputable
discriminatory impact.
Thus, the widespread ethnic discrimination identified by real estate agents is not statistically significant in
the audit study that controls for residence, while residential discrimination, which is not seen as important
by real estate agents, is statistically significant in the same study.
The qualitative interviews lead to the elimination of one of the three hypotheses developed in Section
1.3, that there might be something like pure discrimination against a type of area of residence. The real
estate agents we interviewed never mentioned this, either directly or indirectly.12 Furthermore, there is
no reason to assume that this might be an effect of a social desirability bias, as real estate agents are
not shy about documenting racial discrimination, which is more controversial. We now discuss whether
the remaining two hypotheses (hypotheses H1 and H3) are consistent with the double paradox revealed
above.
Discussion of H1: "statistical discrimination through proxying applicants’ solvency"
The first hypothesis is that real estate agents are primarily concerned with insolvency and that any cor-
relates with insolvency (including residential or ethnic origins) may lead to biases in tenants selection
through mechanisms of statistical discrimination (i.e. the combination of information about ethnicity and
residence interacts in signaling low socio-economic background, which translates into a marker of greater
likelihood of insolvency, leading real estate agents to select against these applicants). This hypothesis is
in line with former studies highlighting that the French housing market legal framework may be overly
12One may suspect this result to be biased since real estate agents may have denied the existence of residential discrimina-
tion in order to be clear about them not admitting any type of illegal bias. However, at the time of the interviews, only racial
discrimination was both illegal and subject to testing by associations. Such was not the case of residential discrimination.
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protective of tenants,13 which leads to increasing landlords’ concerns about potential problems of default
of payment on the rent.14
This hypothesis may appear to be consistent with the double paradox and it is also in line with a
prevailing political and scientific belief that, unlike the American context, ethnicity and race are less
prominent inequality factors in France (Wacquant, 2008). In other words, the nonsignificant effect of
ethnicity when residential origin is controlled for can be read as a demonstration of the supremacy of
class over race in generating social inequality in France reducing thus the disadvantage experienced by
ethnic minorities to socio-economic and “color-blind” factors. Within this framework, the double paradox
in our findings is no more a paradox but could be interpreted as evidence that residential location is used
as a proxy for insolvency or “bad tenant” (and not for “race”) and that real estate agents perceive white
applicants from bad neighborhoods as bad as minority applicants from bad neighborhoods.
If this interpretation may be appealing, it should be noted that it is not directly established by our
findings but rather stems from a speculative explanation buildings on prior studies on the legal French
housing market environment. It nonetheless may appear to be in contradiction with growing empirical
evidence on ethnic and racial inequality in France documented in diverse social spheres (labor and hous-
ing markets, schooling and education, spatial segregation, health, access to law and public services, etc.).
In fact, the contradiction is not so straightforward because hypothesis 1 could also be read in line with the
sociological concept of systemic or indirect discrimination (Bonilla-Silva, 2013): the legal structure of
the housing market in France could lead to systematic ethnic bias although its driving mechanisms may
not be directly oriented toward ethnic minorities. All in all, if residential origin is a powerful proxy for
insolvency, it indirectly undermines ethnic minority chances in the rental market simply because ethnic
minorities are highly concentrated in these disadvantaged neighborhoods.
Discussion of H3: "neighborhood as a proxy for ethnicity”
The other hypothesis is that residential stigma proxies ethnic stigma. Ethnicity would thus be the signal
that affects real estate agents’ decisions when selecting among applicants and information about place of
residence is used to proxy ethnic origin. Moreover, even if residential origin is translated into ethnic origin
in real estate agents’ minds, it may be more conducive to discriminatory decisions than overt information
about ethnic origin (like for instance an African name) because of a less pronounced desirability bias of
residential discrimination. This may explain the fact that, in our data, the negative impact of ethnicity
becomes less powerful when the applicant presents his/her residence first.
This assumption challenges the “cumulative perception” of stigmas according to which one disad-
13We have observed, in this context and in other studies (Bonnet et al., 2011), that landlords are very cautious in their
selection of tenants, probably because the French legal environment makes evictions a long and difficult process. We also
noticed that some landlords discriminate against lawyers. Our analysis was that this was related to the complexity of the rules
on eviction and the financial cost for landlords associated with the risk of default on the rent.
14According to the European Community Household Panel (1994-2002), 10.6% of tenants self-reported in the survey that
they had experienced a default on the rent in the last year. Some of these defaults were only temporary, but others were
recurrent problems of default.
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vantaging factor would simply add a discriminatory effect to the other. Instead of this additive effect
(residence would disadvantage everyone but even more ethnic minority candidates), our findings suggest
that one variable (residence) may substitute the other (ethnicity) making its effect redundant especially
when it is the first of the two pieces of information revealed in a potentially discriminatory interaction. It
is also important to note that this redundancy appears to take place through a proxying process. Some el-
ements in the interviews support the fact that residence may be used to proxy ethnicity. Indeed, the very
few interviewees who elaborated on the question about residential discrimination mentioned “cultural
arguments” directly linked to ethnic origin: fluency and accent in French.
Overall, H3 helps understand the results related to the geographic origin effect in the regressions
performed with the phone conversations from procedure 2: because ethnic origin has been revealed at
the beginning of the conversation, the proxying process of ethnicity through residence is not activated.
However, this still does not solve the puzzle of the lack of significance of the ethnic origin variable
in the procedure where ethnicity was revealed first to the real estate agent, and residence was revealed
later. Possible explanations may draw on the weakness of names in proxying ethnicity in France.15
Residential origin may hence be a more effective proxy of ethnicity. Using in-person testers can be a
useful strategy to eliminate this possible proxying process and better disentangle between the effects of
ethnic and residential origins while measuring discrimination.
6 Conclusion
Our approach necessarily implies some limitations. First, housing search involves several steps. Our
audit study analyzes only the earliest stage of this process. Whilst this would be problematic to measure
the overall level of discrimination, we think that it is relevant for our less ambitious puspose, which is
detecting the existence of discriminatory practices. These are readily visible in the first contact between
housing applicants and real-estate agents.
This being acknowledged, the paper adds to the urban literature on residential segregation by pro-
viding empirical support for the argument that living in a given neighborhood may hinder households’
residential mobility. We contribute to the scholarship on place-based exclusion, already documented
on redlining (Aalbers, 2007) and steering (Galster and Godfrey, 2005), by adding the rental market di-
mension. From a methodological perspective, our research shows the discrepancy between the results
obtained using different methods (audit and face-to-face interviews). This may be due to the uncon-
sciousness of some discriminating acts, that face-to-face interview should address in one way or another.
This may also challenge the relevance of measuring interaction between discriminatory factors. The un-
derlying framework of such studies is dominated by the cumulative or additive disadvantage paradigm.
15Names have been frequently used in paired-testing audit in France to signal ethnic origin and have been proven to have
significant discriminatory effects. However, some recent quantitative analyses suggest that experience of discrimination in
France is also highly frequent among “visible minorities” (Beauchemin et al., 2010) and may thus indicate that testing studies
should try to measure discrimination through personal interactions. Personal interactions nevertheless increase methodological
vulnerability of testing studies due to the well-known problem of individual heterogeneity.
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However, when two stigmas are so interconnected in social representations, substitution mechanisms can
take place when one stigma proxies another. Further research should therefore explore the implications
of such proxying processes on the measurement of discrimination.
From a substantive point of view, our dual research protocol has enabled us to discard one of our
three hypotheses: the idea of pure residential discrimination does not make sense. Two non-exclusive
hypotheses remain: a statistical discrimination conjecture where real estate agents make inferences about
insolvency through information about residence, and a pure ethnic discrimination conjecture where res-
idence is a proxy for race/ethnicity. Further research integrating qualitative insights and systematic data
may help us resolve this.
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A Audit study design
This appendix provides an extensive description of our audit study.
A.1 Background and prior methods
Our audit study was largely inspired by prior audits that have been conducted elsewhere than in France.
The example of the United States is by far the most influential. Since the late 1970s, the U.S. Department
of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) has been monitoring series of nationwide paired-testing audit
studies in both rental and sales markets. The objectives, methods and results of these studies are carefully
documented in reports published by the HUD’s office of development and research. They define the state
of the art in the implementation of audit methods and provide thorough discussions of the statistical
procedures used to analyze audit data.16 This section provides a brief description of these canonical audit
studies to help the reader understand better how our own audit study was designed and implemented.
Nationwide audit studies monitored by the HUD have been conducted once every decade since the
first study launched in 1977. Over time, the scope and methods have evolved, but there is unity in several
features that can be summarized as follows:
1. Experiment: In its very essence, a housing audit study is an experiment where two testers (one
from the majority group and the other from a minority group) are matched, trained to appear com-
parable in several observable dimensions and then put into contact with real estate and rental agents
(Turner, 1992).
2. Measurement: The outcome (or treatment) received by each tester can be encoded and subse-
quently used in statistical analysis. Systematic comparison of these outcomes allows detecting
discrimination against one tester of the pair. Ultimately, differential treatments can be summarized
by statistics. It should be underlined that what is being measured is often subject to debates (Heck-
man, 1998; Yinger, 1998), and also that interpretability is not the unique purpose of these statistics.
Indeed, the HUD aims at producing figures that can be compared across regions and over time;
interpretation set aside, those allow measurement of geographic differentials and/or time trends.
3. Selection of testing areas: Cost and logistic considerations suggest that metropolitan areas are best
designated for conducting audit studies. Since the HUD aims at producing representative estimates,
it uses Census data to draw samples of metropolitan testing sites and to achieve high coverage of
areas with minorities. The 2012 national audit study for instance covers 28 metropolitan sites
(Turner et al., 2013).
16Of course, these paired-testing audit studies are not the only housing audit studies in the United States. Many smaller
scale housing audits also exist and have been conducted since the first national audit study of 1977; see for instance Yinger
(1986) for an analysis of an early local audit study conducted in Boston in 1981.
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4. Selection of advertisements: Advertisements are drawn in accordance with routine search behav-
iors of housing applicants. Historically, audit studies have relied on advertisements found in major
newspapers (Turner, 1992; Yinger, 1998). The 2012 audit study adapted its protocol to reflect new
practices brought about by technology changes over the past decades; it sought to take into account
housing searches via cell phone, the Internet, etc. (Turner et al., 2013).
5. Selection of the minority group: The minority group is chosen in order to test for potential dis-
criminatory actions against that specific group. For instance the 1977 audit study tested for dis-
crimination against Black housing applicants only. The 1989 audit study extended the experiment
to Hispanic housing applicants and the 2000 audit study to Hispanic, Asian and Native American
housing applicants (Turner, 1992; Turner et al., 2013).
The nationwide audit studies just described are tailored to address specific concerns in relation to race
or ethnicity in the U.S., and to assess enforcement of the federal law (the 1968 Fair Housing Act). Our
paired-testing audit study contrasts in scope and objective and we can summarize the major differences
as follows:
• We focus on a single metropolitan area. Our goal is not produce nationally-representative figures
on housing discrimination. Instead, we test whether minority home-seekers systematically receive
less favorable treatments within a geographic area where market tightness induces landlords to be
very selective about applicants.
• We focus on the first possible contact between applicants and rental agents, i.e. phone conver-
sations, and we do not organize face-to-face meetings. This choice was not dictated by budget
limitations only; as explained below, phone conversations are well designated to capture potential
discriminatory actions that we seek to study.
• We focus on the private rental housing market. Buying a home is a relatively more complex process
and it is clear that phone conversations would be less effective in detecting potential discriminatory
actions involved in this process. Moreover, the scenario of our audit study would have been less
plausible in the context of home buying, particularly for apartments located within the city of Paris.
Our paired-testing audit nevertheless retains some of the unifying characteristics listed above. Broadly
speaking, our study reproduces the experiment described in (1) and (2): we matched an individual from
a majority (white) group with an individual from a minority group, put them into contact with real estate
agents and compared the treatment each of them received. How the unifying traits (3) and (4) reflected
in our audit study is explained in Sections A.2 and A.3 below: those provide detailed information about
the targeted metropolitan area and ads that we sampled. The remaining unifying trait (5) is discussed in
Sections A.4 and A.5 which describe the selection of testers and their fictitious identities.
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Figure A1. Map of région Île-de-France
A.2 Targeted metropolitan area
Our audit study was done in Paris and in several cities of the region Île-de-France. We focused on the
private rental housing market, which accounts for 35% of the housing stock in Paris, and for 21% of the
housing stock in the whole region Île-de-France (figures for the year 2006 excerpted from Jankel and
Salembier, 2008).17
Within the city of Paris, we sampled Internet postings on the popular website http://www.seloger.
com for housing units located in almost all arrondissements (administrative district) of Paris and obtained
observations for 14 out of the 20 arrondissements. Outside the city of Paris, we restricted the study
to cities with direct connections by public transportation (metro or RER) to Paris. The data resulting
from our audit study thus include housing units located inside Paris, in some cities from the “inner ring”
(départements 92, 93 and 94) and in some cities from the “outer ring” (départements 77, 78, 91 and 95)
– see Figure A1.
Table A1 displays a set of statistics characterizing the housing vacancies of our audit study. We also
report descriptive statistics about the size and rent of privately rented apartments in the Paris region. We
targeted apartments for couples without kids. As shown in the table, the surface areas in our dataset fall
well in the range of one- to two-room apartments as measured by representative surveys. Rents per square
17Within the European Union, France has a slightly lower home ownership rate compared to the European average : 58%
against 65 in the EU in 2007 ; the rate increased in France since then and is about 62% in 2013.
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Table A1. Characteristics of the housing units, in our audit study and overall
Sample of our audit study Representative sample
N Rent Surface Rent per Sq. Surface Surface Rent per Sq.
(C) (Sq. meter) meter (C) one-room two-room meter (C)
(Sq. meter) (Sq. meter)
Full sample 250 749 41 19.30 22.46
Median 748 39 18.60
25% centile 685 33 16.18
75% centile 815 46 21.52
Median in Paris 45 750 32 25.00 25 42 28.06
Median in Dept. 77 37 660 40 16.67 27 44 14.00
Median in Dept. 78 37 815 45 18.17 29 48 17.44
Median in Dept. 91 40 706 42 17.32 30 42 15.04
Median in Dept. 92 38 716 33 21.18 27 44 22.92
Median in Dept. 93 2 720 35 20.61 28 42 17.92
Median in Dept. 94 11 750 40 20.29 28 44 19.27
Median in Dept. 95 40 800 50 15.54 28 46 16.09
NOTE: Surfaces are measured in square meters (Sq. meter); Rents are reported in euros (C). Representative figures for the
surface area of one-room and two-room apartments are for the year 2011; they are extracted from an extensive report of the
Observatoire des loyers (Observatory of rents) written by Coz and Prandi (2012). Representative figures for Rents per square
meters are from the information-aggregator website http://www.lacoteimmo.com which gathers information on rents for
apartments advertised online.
meter are also remarkably in line with the data; in particular, housing vacancies in our dataset reproduce
the observed disparities across départements. Overall, the table suggests that housing vacancies that form
the basis of our empirical work adequately match the housing stock of the Paris region.
Our focus on small-sized apartments advertised on the Internet was motivated by some further con-
siderations. First, these are the apartments typically looked for by middle-class households such as our
fictitious applicants. Second, the information provided on Internet postings is typically comprehensive.
In the phone conversations, testers could thus limit their questions to availability and viewing. This has
two advantages: to reduce the array of possible conversation outcomes and to minimize risks of suspi-
cious real estate agents. The conclusion from our protocol is that this experimental design was sufficient
to capture possible discriminatory actions at this early stage of the housing search process.
Vacancy rates for apartments are much higher in the region Île-de-France relative to the rest of France.
No less than 70% of vacant housing units are located within the Paris metropolitan area (Decondé, 2012).
6.2% of all housing units located in the region Île-de-France are vacant, and the corresponding figures
for the city of Paris alone rises to 9.2%. This tightness of the housing market is not caused by a lack
of housing applicants (Bonnet et al., 2011). Instead, it reflects the fact that landlords are very cautious
in their selection of tenants, probably because the French legal environment makes evictions a long and
difficult process. Higher vacancy rates in the region Île-de-France (and the possibility that it results in
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discriminatory actions) thus make it a relevant case for our audit study .
A.3 Sampling of ads
We collected advertisements for housing units from the website http://www.seloger.com. This is a
major platform for real estate agents who choose to advertise their vacancies on the Internet. Users can
sort advertised units along a number of criteria, such as the rent, size, location, etc. Our focus on relatively
small-sized apartments, located in specific geographical area and for a selected rent range implies that
we could almost exhaust the corresponding units advertised on the website. As shown in Table A1,
the latter provided a close-to-representative cross-section of the targeted housing units located in the
Paris metropolitan area. Further, it covers a large share of online connections to real estate agencies’
advertisements. According to the French audience measurement company Mediamétrie, Se loger was the
first online agency in France in 2009-2010 (time of the survey) and was still second in 2012. It had more
than 3 millions of monthly single IP connections, amounting to 7% of all internet users in France.18
A.4 The testers
Our audit study was carried out by a team of 8 individuals, aged 22 to 28, 2 women and 6 men (hereafter:
the “testers”). All testers were highly skilled and were fully informed about the situation, of what was to
be tested, and knew that any deviation from the methodology would invalidate the results. Two half-day
training sessions were also organized to give testers a better understanding of the objective. They were
all explicitly told the following: “We don’t know whether there is discrimination along those dimensions.
Remain neutral, both during the phone call and in reporting the results.” They were asked to report a
maximum of qualitative information. In particular, there was a variable to indicate “a suspicion of audit”,
included to report questions by the agent such as “Did you call yesterday?”. This occurred overall in 7
cases out of 340 calls during the first phase. All testers were explicitly involved in the design of part of
the procedures, notably to determine the final encoding of variables.
Our testers did not have any particular accent, and we instructed them not to fake any during the
phone conversations. Our main concern was that accents typically associated to French minority suburbs
convey information about both residential and ethnic origins, which we aimed to disentangle in this study.
Thus, we suspected that accents would, in general, reinforce the impact of any of our two discriminatory
criteria while making the interpretation of the coefficients more difficult. Setting aside accents was also
dictated by the fact that the relevant information about residential or ethnic origin was to be revealed at
the very beginning of phone conversations, which turned out to be very brief. Accents would have added
a complex ingredient to these short talks, and we found this undesirable: any effect of ethnicity would
have been jointly attributed to ethnicity itself and to the lack of cultural integration this accent would
have revealed.
18http://www.journaldunet.com/ebusiness/le-net/immobilier-mediametrie/seloger.shtml
A.5 Scenarii
Testers were assigned fictitious identities designed to impersonate the average housing applicant in the
Paris region. Fictitious identities would include a name, a place of residence, an occupation and an
income level, for instance: “Sébastien Fournier (French name) / Kader Boualem (North African name),
lives in La Courneuve (deprived suburb) / Versailles (rich suburb), is 31 years-old, works as an accountant
and earns a monthly wage of 1,700C”. These identities also included a marital status (married with no
kid), an occupation and an income for the spouse: typically, “works as a secretary and earns 1,300C per
month”. Finally, testers were attributed a geographical area around Paris that would be consistent with
their asserted willingness to relocate.
Our choice of fictitious identities was motivated by the following observations:
• According to Charrier et al. (2008), the monthly income of household applying for housing on the
Paris private rental housing market was 2,909C in the census year 2006 (2,638C for the region
Île-de-France as a whole), and average household income was 3,103C in Paris (3,131C at the level
of the region).
• The same study reports that professionals (Cadres et professions intellectuelles supérieures) ac-
count for one-third of the population working in Paris, and is even higher among those applying
for housing on the rental market (as high as 52%). This is followed by intermediary professions
(Professions intermediaires, i.e. clerical workers with university education) which account for 14%
of the population in the Paris metropolitan area. The occupations for the fictitious applicant and
his/her partner were selected to reflect these figures.
With regards to asserted ethnic and residential origins, those were selected as follows:
• Names were chosen to signal origin from either France or North Africa. We followed the method-
ology of the International Labour Office described by Cediey and Foroni (2008). Specifically, we
used the following “North-African” fictitious names: Rachid Ammelal, Mehdi Belbouab, Hafsa
Belhadj, Farid Boukhrit, Kader Boualem, Habib El Bekkali and Fathia Laouadi; for “white French”
ones: Marion Denis, Pascal Dubois, Sébastien Fournier, Sébastien Pialoux, Julie Morvan, Julien
Roche and Gilles Rousseau.
• The fictitious current locations were chosen among cities of the Île-de-France region that are ei-
ther notoriously deprived, or privileged. Some of the selected deprived cities had experienced the
2005 urban riots. Cities used to signal deprived neighbourhoods were: Bagneux, Bondy, Gennevil-
liers, Saint Ouen, Sarcelles, Trappes and Villeneuve Saint-Georges; cities used to signal privileged
neighbourhoods were Le Raincy, Levallois, Meudon, Nogent sur Marne, Sceaux, Versailles and
Vincennes.
We collected and reported in Table A2 some summary statistics about each of the city of respon-
dents in our audit study. Further, what matters in the selection process is the typical represen-
tations of these neighbourhoods (good vs. bad) as, for instance, conveyed by the media after
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Table A2. Characteristics of cities selected in the audit
Share of owners Median income Unemp. Rate 15-64 Share of immigrants
(%) (*) (%) (%) (**)
a. Cities used to signal deprived neighbourhoods
Bagneux 25.7 17,508 14.2 21.2
Bondy 43.8 14,088 18.8 28.8
Gennevilliers 19.6 13,614 18.5 30.6
Saint Ouen 20.5 14,505 18.7 32.4
Sarcelles 33.7 12,189 23.2 31.3
Trappes 26.1 13,563 17.4 26.1
Villeneuve Saint-Georges 37.7 13,862 16.7 28.5
b. Cities used to signal privileged neighbourhoods
Le Raincy 61.9 27,430 9.7 11.0
Levallois-Perret 37.1 30,761 9.5 14.7
Meudon 54.2 28,359 8.5 13.5
Nogent sur Marne 52.7 30,680 9.8 13.0
Sceaux 46.4 35,558 8.8 10.6
Versailles 45.8 30,577 7.9 8.8
Vincennes 48.1 31,408 8.7 13.2
NOTE: All variables are for the year 2011, except the share of immigrants (2012). (*) In euro (C) per consumption unit. (**)
French definition of immigrants: persons born abroad and not French at birth (Haut Conseil de l’Intégration).
the 2005 urban riots. The true statistics are (sadly) less relevant in decision making than per-
ceptions. As an anecdote, a recent IPSOS poll indicate that in France, respondents overestimate
by almost a factor 4 the share in population of Muslims in France (estimated to be 31% against
an actual population of 8% according to http://www.economist.com/blogs/graphicdetail/
2015/01/daily-chart-2). A professional real estate agent from the Paris region could not ignore
the social connotations of the chosen cities.
Although our team included two women, we made no attempt to test for discrimination by gender. In-
deed, given the limited number of calls that could be made, it appeared desirable to limit the number of
potentially discriminatory combinations and to focus on ethnic and residential stigma. The two female
testers of our team would thus always work in tandem. Overall, we noticed no significant differences
between the outcomes reported by our pair of female testers relative to male testers.
A.6 Location and Technical Details
Testers were installed in an office provided by our university (Sciences Po). They called from two separate
phones. The first one was installed on a fixed line, opened for this testing procedure as for a private
household and the number of which started in 01 (Paris and suburbs region). Importantly, it differed from
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the Sciences Po numbers that all start with the six numbers 01 45 49. The second one was installed on
an Internet box provided by the telephone company, the number starting in 09 which is not specific to
any region. Both phones had an answering machine. In addition, the first tester was given a cell phone.
When rental brokers asked for a phone number to call back, the first tester would give the cell phone
number and the second tester would give the number starting in 09 (which does not necessary indicates a
fixed line). Testers would never call at the exact same time; they would instead work sequentially. Phone
calls were given during regular office hours on weekdays. Providing testers with an answering machine
appeared necessary in order to refine the measurement of the outcome of the conversations.
A.7 Timing
A typical session consisted in a sequence of phone calls (i) to vacancies that had been contacted before
and (ii) to new vacancies. The first tester reported the day and hour of the phone call as well as an
identifier of the vacancy so that the second tester could call back the same vacancy after a “long enough”
period of time had elapsed. As the duration between the two calls increased, the outcome of the second
call was more likely to be negative for reasons unrelated to discrimination: for instance, another applicant
might have called after the first tester. It was thus necessary to limit the time between calls as much as
possible. However, the audit was more likely to be suspected if the interval was too short, so testers were
encouraged not to wait too long to make the second call. We found a period of half a day to one day to
be a good compromise between these constraints, and testers were able to follow this procedure in most
cases.
We insisted on switching the order in which phone calls were made, so that the tester responsible with
the role of minority applicant would call first as often as the other tester. Every four calls, testers thus had
to invert the order. In the resulting dataset, the order is perfectly balanced across pairs of calls and there
is hence no systematic association with the fictitious identities of the testers.
A.8 Encoding
As indicated in the body of the paper, the outcomes of conversations were coded as follows:
Code Outcome
1 Apartment is already rented, nothing else available
2 Caller is asked to send a written application with personal details
3 Real estate agent will call back, but no return call
4 Apartment is already rented but something else is available
5 Real estate agent plans a group visit
6 Real estate agent plans an individual visit
The outcomes are rank-ordered. We decided on this method of coding after several days of trials
and about 50 calls. Code 4 was considered inferior to 5 and 6 because it may indicate steering. Code
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3 could have been considered inferior to Code 2, but the testers themselves reported that Code 2 was
frequently a polite way to send applicants off. Code 3 on the other hand might be due to a random event,
especially during rush hours and because of the high turnover rates for Paris apartments. Finally, Code 3
was changed appropriately into 4, 5 or 6 when real estate agents called back as promised or left a message
on the answering machine of each tester.
When testers were redirected towards a different apartment (Code 4), we were unable to test whether
this could be due to steering because testers were usually not given sufficiently many details about the
alternative offer. We note that this was located in the same city in most cases and there are hence reasons
to assume that the other unit was a proper substitute. However, because we cannot test this assumption
directly, we offer robustness checks in Appendix B with respect to Code 4.
A.9 Additional information
We conducted about 50 experimental phone calls before opting for our final setup. Two constraints
appeared worthy of consideration. First, although there were, in principle, four scenarios that we would
have liked to test (good name/good location, bad name/good location, etc.), we could not ask four testers
to contact the same advertised dwelling. To avoid detection of the audit, it was necessary to impose a
delay of at least 24 hours between phone calls for the same vacancy. With four scenarios, this would have
required almost a week to contact the same vacancy, which, given the high rate of turnover of the housing
vacancies contacted, was not feasible. Second, the typical phone conversation was extremely short (often
less than one minute), which limited the number of “signals” (geographic origin or ethnic origin) that
could be revealed within the phone conversation.
Throughout the duration of the experiment, we had frequent debriefings with our team. We asked
tester to report subjective information about each phone calls in order to monitor them more efficiently.
Eventually, we were able to check whether this information (which we encoded in our final dataset)
affected the variability of the outcome across testers and/or across phone conversations and found no
systematic relationship.
A.10 External validity and replication
Due to budget limitations, we were not able to extend our audit study to other major metropolitan areas
of France, such as Lyon or Marseille. The Paris region is much bigger, more diverse, and overall more
economically developed than provincial urban agglomerations. It is hence a natural candidate to conduct
experiments aimed at assessing the extent and nature of discrimination in France. Further research in
the rest of France would also be informative especially to uncover regional patterns, and would provide
valuable material for comparisons.
We noted above that our experimental design appeared sufficient to capture possible discriminatory
actions at the early stage of the housing search process. We hope to have provided enough details in this
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appendix to allow for replication of the study. Our design could also be adapted to specific settings in
other countries. Finally, the detailed depiction of our experiment provided in this appendix should allow
direct comparison to the methods implemented in other audits.
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B Additional tables and results
Cross-tabulation of the outcomes
As shown in Figure 1 in the paper, outcome 6 (individual visit planned) and 3 (we will call you back but no
return call) were the most frequent outcomes of the phone conversations. In Tables B1 and B2, we cross-
tabulate the outcomes. This is instructive because if we were to analyze only the phone conversations
which resulted in these two outcomes only, the detection of discriminatory practices would come from
rows and columns 3 and 6 in the Tables. Fortunately for the purpose of identification, we notice that when
one candidate was told that he/she would be called back, the other candidate was told the same thing in
only half of all cases. Furthermore, the table indicates that this tended to be more favorable to the majority
candidate in the first procedure. Indeed, when the majority candidate was to be called back, the minority
candidate obtained an individual viewing in 23% of all cases (row 3, column 6 in Table B1), whereas
when the minority candidate was told to expect a phone call back, the majority candidate managed to
arrange an individual visit in 39% of all cases (row 6, column 3 in Table B1). In the second procedure on
the other hand, the odds were more balanced: these percentages become 27% (row 3, column 6 in Table
B2) and 17% (row 6, column 3 in Table B2), respectively. This reiterates the finding that discriminatory
practices affected the outcomes under the first procedure, but not in the second procedure.
Robustness check 1: bootstrapping pairs in procedure #1
To assess the sensitivity of our results to the difference in sample sizes across procedures, we replicate
the finding of procedure #1 by boostraping pairs of phone calls so as to obtain comparable sample sizes.
That is, we randomly select pairs of calls among the 177 initial pairs and re-estimate the generic linear
models specified in the paper. We focus on our preferred specifications, i.e. regressions with audit-
level fixed effects (columns (IV)–(VII) in Table 3 of the paper). To accord with the sample sizes of the
second procedure, we select 77 pairs. The results from the bootstrap procedure based on 500 replications
are reported in Table B3. The significance level is reduced but the main coefficient of interest remains
significant at the 10 percent level in regressions that control better for differences across individual phone
calls (columns (III) and (IV)).
Robustness check 2: sensitivity with respect to outcome no. 4
As we note in Subsection A.8 of Appendix A, we were unable to test whether outcome 4 (Apartment
is already rented but something else is available) could reflect steering instead of redirection towards a
proper substitute for the initial apartment. Nevertheless, we can offer two series of robustness checks
with respect to outcome no. 4:
• First, we can group Code 4 with Codes 1, 2 and 3 (“rather negative outcome”) and re-estimate
our models. If our assumption that Code 4 indicated a neutral or either positive outcome, then we
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Table B3. Robustness check 1: discrimination rates with bootstraped pairs in procedure #1
Procedure #1 (residence first) (I) (II) (III) (IV)
Deprived suburb -0.1098 -0.1227 -0.1301 -0.1373
(0.0703) (0.0751) (0.0786) (0.0793)
Minority name (North Africa) 0.1273 0.1046
(0.1358) (0.1411)
Name revealed 0.2415 0.2373
(0.1465) (0.1494)
Name revealed x Minority Name -0.1888 -0.1747
(0.1706) (0.1728)
Controls:
Individual call Y Y
Audit fixed effects Y Y Y Y
N 154 154 154 154
R2 0.0311 0.0443 0.0668 0.0775
NOTE: Standard errors in parentheses. Standard errors are obtained under a bootstrap procedure where 77 pairs are chosen
randomly among the 177 initial pairs. Each column reports the coefficients g and b estimated along with a specific set of
controls. Name revealed is a dummy indicating whether the tester revealed his/her name in the phone conversation. Charac-
teristics at the level of the individual phone calls are: a dummy indicating whether the tester used the phone line with a number
starting with 09 (indicating Internet box) and a dummy indicating whether he/she called first.
expect the coefficient on the dummy for the minority candidate to be lower in absolute value. We
also expect the fit of the regression to be lower than under the benchmark specification.
• Second, we can run our regressions on the subsample of audit pairs where neither the minority
candidate nor the majority candidate was offered to visit a different housing unit. As this effectively
reduces the size of the sample, we expect the coefficient to be less precisely, but without any change
in sign.
For economy of space, here again we focus on our preferred specifications, i.e. with audit-level fixed
effects. Table B4 reports the estimation results under the two audit procedures: columns (I)–(IV) show
the results obtained after grouping Code 4 with Codes 1 to 3 and columns (V)–(VIII) show the results
obtained after excluding outcome 4.
It is clear that our results are not driven by outcome no 4. Our estimates in the first procedure remain
almost unchanged and statistically significant, even with a smaller sample size when audit pairs with
Code 4 are excluded. Conversely, no significant change occurs in the second procedure. Overall, this
robustness check confirms the analysis of Tables B1 and B2 showing that detection of discrimination
(and the lack thereof) relies mostly on outcomes 3 and 6, but not on outcome 4.
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Table B4. Robustness check 2: sensitivity with respect to outcome no. 4
Procedure #1 Grouping Code 4 with Codes 1–3 Excluding Pairs with Code 4
(residence first) (I) (II) (III) (IV) (V) (VI) (VII) (VIII)
Deprived suburb -0.1156 -0.1227 -0.1268 -0.1284 -0.1286 -0.1324 -0.1425 -0.1453
(0.0449) (0.0449) (0.0503) (0.0500) (0.0496) (0.0499) (0.0545) (0.0543)
Minority name 0.1046 0.0873 0.1679 0.1639
(North Africa) (0.0837) (0.0875) (0.0926) (0.0936)
Name revealed 0.1213 0.1246 0.1827 0.1753
(0.0957) (0.0964) (0.1048) (0.1063)
Name revealed -0.1632 -0.1584 -0.2577 -0.2483
x Minority Name (0.1099) (0.1096) (0.1200) (0.1177)
Controls:
Individual call Y Y Y Y
Audit fixed effects Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
N 346 346 345 345 280 280 279 279
R2 0.0373 0.0413 0.0543 0.0590 0.0463 0.0532 0.0823 0.0846
R2 with fixed effect 0.8010 0.8018 0.8077 0.8086 0.8272 0.8285 0.8369 0.8373
Procedure #2 Grouping Code 4 with Codes 1–3 Excluding Pairs with Code 4
(ethnicity first) (I) (II) (III) (IV) (V) (VI) (VII) (VIII)
Minority name 0.0260 0.0323 0.0303 0.0367 0.0423 0.0526 0.0391 0.0478
(0.0524) (0.0585) (0.0572) (0.0674) (0.0549) (0.0599) (0.0597) (0.0694)
Deprived suburb 0.0375 0.0376 0.0285 0.0269
(0.0567) (0.0583) (0.0606) (0.0617)
Residence revealed -0.0295 -0.0131 0.0890 0.0969
(0.2462) (0.2747) (0.2386) (0.2725)
Residence revealed -0.0803 -0.0972 -0.1566 -0.1659
x Deprived suburb (0.2379) (0.2727) (0.2422) (0.2792)
Controls:
Individual call Y Y Y Y
Audit fixed effects Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
N 154 154 154 154 142 142 142 142
R2 0.0032 0.0081 0.0130 0.0178 0.0085 0.0115 0.0183 0.0222
R2 with fixed effect 0.8827 0.8833 0.8839 0.8844 0.8890 0.8893 0.8901 0.8905
NOTE: Estimates that are statistically significant at the 5% level are in boldface. Standard errors in parentheses. Standard
errors are clustered at the audit level. Each column reports the coefficients g and b estimated along with a specific set of
controls for each procedure. Name revealed (resp. residence revealed) is a dummy indicating whether the tester revealed
his/her name in the phone conversation of the first procedure (resp. residential origin in the second procedure). Characteristics
at the level of the individual phone calls are: a dummy indicating whether the tester used the phone line with a number starting
with 09 (indicating Internet box) and a dummy indicating whether he/she called first.
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C Interviews
This appendix provides a description of our interviews.
We interviewed 29 real-estate agents between June and October 2010. We divided the Paris region
into six sub-regions (Paris / inner ring / outer ring, each subdivided in white-rich and minority-poor).
Each of the six sub-regions was assigned to a research assistant, who had to interview five real-estate
agents from the area (one research assistant only performed four interviews). We opted for this sampling
strategy to maximize heterogeneity within the area covered by our audit study.
In each sub-region, we drew a list of agencies from Internet postings on http://www.seloger.com,
and research assistants were tasked with contacting agencies with a letter explaining the study (that we
provided ourselves). There are two reasons why we avoided sampling the agencies we had audited.
(1) We have been extremely cautious with avoiding suspicions of audit. Suspicious real-estate agents
may purposefully distort their behavior, which would undermine the reliability of our findings. (2) It
is impossible to infer discriminatory behavior from one particular pair of audits. Random reasons may
explain why a rental unit was available to the white candidate and not to the minority candidate. Only
consistent patterns of differential treatment reveal discrimination; these patterns only make sense within a
quantitative framework. It would have been a logical stretch to treat these interviewees as discriminatory.
We did not compensate our informants and we guaranteed anonymity. Interviews consistently lasted
about 60 minutes and took place at the agency. These were semi-structured interviews, for which we had
provided the interview guide. The three main themes of the guide were: (1) context (informant’s work
history, description of her current job, of the neighborhood where she works); (2) a detailed account of
how agents select tenants on behalf of landlords; (3) discrimination. To minimize social desirability con-
cerns, we did not impose the discrimination theme; we let it develop organically from the discussion on
selection practices. In such cases, an explicit question was also asked about “residence-based discrimi-
nation” in this section. We did not ask our respondents about their own discriminatory practices or their
own attitudes toward minorities. All interviews were recorded and then transcribed; notes were taken
during the interviews.
Summing the duration of the interviews, we obtained 1,665 minutes of audio recordings. The tran-
scribed interviews single-spaced and written in 12 point font is 495 pages long. Additional information
is available from the authors upon request.
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